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2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which holds a
coercing state indirectly responsible for an injurious act committed by
a coerced state. Not only does this provision lack support from state
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formulation ensure that this provision does not significantly influence
the evolution of state practice. Indeed, it would have been better for
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I. INTRODUCTION

The law of state responsibility is one of the most complex areas
of international law, in terms of both articulating and implementing
its principles. The International Law Commission (ILC or
Commission) spending over five decades to write its Draft Articles on
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State Responsibility (Draft Articles) testifies to this truth.' Aspects of
state responsibility within this body of law that have little, if any,
support from state practice are that much more difficult to
understand in practical terms. One such aspect is the law relating to
indirect state responsibility that arises from coercion of another state.
Draft Article 18 is the most recent rubric for holding a coercing state
indirectly responsible for an injurious act committed by a coerced
state:
A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally
responsible for that act if: (a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an
internationally wrongful act of the coerced State; and (b) the coercing
2
State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act.

This formulation of state responsibility remains largely theoretical.
The relatively weak cases cited in the Commentaries, which are
based on tenuous counterfactual reasoning, and the absence of
stronger cases indicate that this Article does not reflect customary
international law. Moreover, three structural flaws of Article 18
essentially ensure that this provision will never become customary
international law: (1) a veritable catch-22 involving the definition of
coercion, (2) the disappearance of the internationally wrongful act,
and (3) an overly strict and confused standard of attributive
causation in the language "but for the coercion." Each flaw further
enables coercing states to plausibly deny this brand of responsibility.
With these perceived defects, Article 18 never will sufficiently deter
states from engaging in coercion and may even encourage it.
3
Therefore, it would be best if this provision were removed altogether.
This Article is divided into five parts, with this introduction and
a brief conclusion constituting Parts I and V, respectively. Part II
explains the notion of indirect responsibility and provides a brief
history of the development of this notion that leads to coercion of
another state as a basis for state responsibility. Part III critically
analyzes the state practice supposedly supporting this provision and
explains why it is important. This Part also looks at the general
prohibition of coercion under customary international law and why
this might be the normative purpose behind Article 18's stand-alone
existence. Part IV, the pivotal portion of this Article, sets out in
detail the three structural flaws that are so detrimental to the
application of Article 18. The lack of firm state practice hints at the

1.

See

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

COMMISSION,

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

(2006),

available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.htm. See generally Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/10 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
2.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 18.
3.
The Author acknowledges the unlikelihood that the ILC will reopen the
debate on this point, though this reality does not reduce the value of critically
assessing the ILC's work.
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ultra-progressive nature of Article 18, though these three blemishes
are what ensure that Article 18 will remain in the virtual realm until
amendment.
Critics might assert that many of the arguments here are overly
formalistic; however, one must not forget that legal formalism is
likely the best tool for a lawyer to use in criticizing the work of an
organization that is itself extremely formalistic in its approach to
codifying international law. Besides legal formalism, this Article
adopts a textualist approach to analyzing Article 18, relying mostly
on the plain meaning of the text, though also looking at the internal
context and structure of the text, to address whether Article 18 is
coherent and reflective of customary international law. 4 Indeed, as
the ILC emphasized strong textualism over contract law in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 5 it presumably
will not mind having textualism applied to its own pronouncements.
While the intent of the Special Rapporteurs and the ILC was
considered in depth, it was not the predominant source of meaning.
In this context, this Article rejects the positivist corrective justice
theory, which states that a decision-maker will not bother with
ambiguous cause-in-fact, but instead will be driven to award damages
based on the coercing state's perceived immorality.6 Although this
might be what happens ultimately if an actual case ever arises
(especially if Article 18 remains in its murky condition), the Draft
Articles are about establishing a coherent system for evaluating state
By doing so, positivist and normative efficiency
responsibility.
theorists will be pleased by the increased predictability that likely
will come from decision-makers. 7 Finally, the purpose of this Article
is not to suggest how Article 18 ought to be amended, but merely to
point out its perceived shortcomings. Despite this critical tenor, the
Author wishes to emphasize that no disrespect is intended to the ILC
8
and its members, whom the Author holds in the highest regard.
Nonetheless, the issues raised here warrant further consideration

4.
See generally Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light
of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 825 (2002) (discussing the
characteristics of new textualism).
5.

See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (4th ed.,

2003).
6.
See generally Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured
Causation: A Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 249, 285 (2003)
(explaining the positivist corrective justice theory in ambiguous cause-in-fact cases).
7.
See id. at 286 (explaining that structured causation will provide for more
predictable and more efficient judicial decisions).
8.
In particular, the Author acknowledges the tremendous work of Special
Rapporteur James Crawford in preparing the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as
presently constituted. While Article 18 might have benefited from a greater allocation
of time, it admittedly was a small piece in a complex area of international law, and his
attention likely was better used on more pressing matters. See Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 18.
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and hopefully will aid in the gradual transformation of the Draft
Articles into customary international law.

II.

INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY AND COERCION

This Part provides the background necessary to fully understand
Article 18 and how it fits into the broader debate over indirect
responsibility. However, before delving into the evolution of the
principle and its sui generis definitions, it is useful to define indirect
responsibility, which is the general topic of Chapter IV of the Draft
Articles containing Article 18. To begin, the full title of Chapter IV is
"Responsibility of a State in Connection with the Act of Another
State,"9 and comprises Articles 16 to 19. Otherwise known by its
shorthand "indirect responsibility," Chapter IV involves the
triangular relationship between the injured state, the state
committing the internationally wrongful act, and a third state that
has some relationship or influence over the state committing the
act.10 In essence, the state committing the internationally wrongful
act has breached an international obligation to the injured state, and
the principle allows the injured state the opportunity to make a claim
against the third state for whatever reason-possibly because the
state committing the internationally wrongful act either is
unavailable or protected by force majeure, or because the injured
state does not otherwise want to bring a claim against that state.
Under Chapter IV, the third state generally is not to be held
responsible for the assistance, direction, or coercion itself, but rather
for the act that flowed from the assistance, direction, or coercion. For
comparison purposes, it might be useful to note how, under Article 16
that deals with aid or assistance in committing an internationally
wrongful act, the third state is not responsible for the internationally
wrongful act per se when assisting in its commission, but for that
state's wrongful participation in the commission of that act. In
comparison, Article 18 does not appear to have any of the states
committing an internationally wrongful act, a point that Part IV(B)
develops further.
After laying out a brief history of the two theories that shaped
this area of indirect responsibility, this Part provides an analysis of
the definitions for coercion that were adopted by the ILC. As
discussed below, the definition's focus on the existence of a temporary
relationship of control during the wrongful act is the fundamental
source of the fictional elements of Article 18.

9.
10.

Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, Ch. IV.
Id.
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A. The Conflict Between Representationand Control Theories
Since the early 1900s, the theoretical framework underlying
indirect responsibility has switched between the representation and
control theories.
Understanding this debate, especially the
arguments of the control theory, is helpful in understanding the
current formulation of Article 18. Early commentaries and draft
articles mentioned the possibility of indirect responsibility of a state
without ever naming coercion of another state as a distinct issue or
even possibility.'1
Dionisio Anzilotti was the first to talk about
indirect responsibility in 1902, though he limited his focus to the
representation theory. 12 He reasoned that an injured state would not
be able to address a represented state in asserting its responsibility,
as the represented state did not carry out its own international
relations; thus, the representing state should be held indirectly
responsible. 13
The main examples of such representative
relationships are Switzerland and Liechtenstein, New Zealand and
Western Samoa, and Italy and San Marino, where there is
representation without any degree of control. The lack of control
meant that an injured state could just as easily make a claim through
the representing state against the represented state as it could make
a claim directly against the represented state, so the reasoning
14
behind the representation theory is not particularly persuasive.
Still, commentators and codifications alike relied on Anzilotti's
representation theory. Indeed, it was adopted within Article IX(2) of
the 1927 Lausanne session on International Responsibility of States
for Injuries on Their Territory to the Person or Property of
Foreigners, 15 Article 3 of the 1929 Harvard Law School Draft
Convention, 16 and even the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case
17
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, to name a few.
In the 1930s, there was a movement away from this theory in
favor of the control theory, which appears to have most influenced the
Draft Articles.' 8 The control theory essentially is based on the link
between responsibility and freedom. Indirect responsibility will apply

11.
See, e.g., Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318, 2(1) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 3 (1979) [hereinafter
Eighth Report].
12.
See id. 1 5.
13.
See id.
14.
It is even less persuasive once one realizes that Anzilotti mentioned no
cases to support his views. See id.
15.
See id. 6 n.ll (citing U.N. Doc. AICN.4/96 annex 8, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
228 (1956)).
16.
See id. 6 n.ll (citing U.N. Doc. AICN.4/96 annex 9, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
228 (1956)).
17.
See id. 6 n.13.
18.
See id.
7, 17 (discussing critiques of the earlier theory and describing the
control theory).
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only if the state that committed the internationally wrongful act was
operating in a sphere of action for which it had complete freedom of
decision. 19 From the perspective of the controlled state, it "should be
responsible for [its] actions towards foreign Governments only in
proportion to [its] freedom of action. '20 Eagleton said in 1928:
[I]f one State controls another in any circumstances which might
prevent the latter from discharging its international obligations, the
basis of a responsibility of the protecting State for the subordinated
State is laid. Responsibility must be located in each separate case by
ascertaining the actual amount of freedom from external control, or
21
conversely, the actual amount of control left, to the respondent State.

Therefore, if there is no restriction on the dependent state's freedom
22
of decision, the dependent state is solely responsible.
From this control theory, one can see the motivation behind all of
Chapter -V dealing with indirect responsibility, though to varying
degrees. Article 17 and its predecessor, Article 28(1), talk specifically
about control of a state leading to indirect responsibility for the
controlling state. 23 As explained in Part III(C) below, if it were not
24
for Article 18 and the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali,
coercion of another state conceivably could fit under this general
rubric of control, as presumably control includes the temporary
variety that results from coercion. Such an approach would have
been favorable, as Article 17 lacks the problematic language "but for"
and the other shortcomings described in Part V. 25 Nonetheless, in
Ago's efforts to be exhaustive in listing all the ways in which states
can be held indirectly responsible, he introduced, and the ILC
adopted, coercion of another state as a separate basis for indirect
responsibility. 26 This notion has been perpetuated in the Second
Reading, though now as a stand-alone Article. 27 To understand why
this was not the ideal approach, to say the least, it is important to
understand the unique definition of coercion in this context, which is
the topic of the next Subpart.

19.
See id. 17.
20.
Id.
17 n.33 (quoting F. DE MARTENS, 1 TRAIT9 DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
379 (A. Leo trans., 1883)).
21.
Id.
17 (quoting CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1928)).

22.
See id.
23.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 17.
24.
The principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali is that when two laws
contradict, the more specific of the two should govern. See generally Michael Lennard,
Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT'L EcON. L. 17, 7071 (2002) (discussing the significance of lex specialis in international law).
25.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 17.
26.
See generally Eighth Report, supra note 11 (analyzing the law surrounding
state responbility and proposing bases for responsibility).
27.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 17.
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B. Coercion in the Context of State Responsibility
For a clear idea of what coercion is in the context of state
responsibility and what type of activities Article 18 covers, it is useful
to explore what it is not. Coercion of another state does not include
direct responsibility, such as acts of organs of a state where there is
no control of another. Nor does coercion include topics falling under
other articles of Chapter IV, in particular the international
relationships of dependence that fall under Article 17 and include
vassalages or protectorates, relations between federal states and the
member states of the federation, and relations between an occupying
state and the occupied state in cases of territorial occupation (where
the occupied supposedly retains sovereignty and international
personality while the occupier controls many sectors). 28
Other
situations that Article 18 does not cover are those covered by Article
16, where one state "aids or assists" the state that committed the
internationally wrongful act, which includes situations where a state
provides essential facilitation or financing for the activity. 29 Coercion
under Article 18 is not about aggression or countermeasures-areas
of the law where coercion commonly is discussed. Finally, Article 18
does not deal with the coercion itself being an internationally
wrongful act, which may or may not be the case and is a separate
issue altogether. Instead, Article 18 is concerned with imputing
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act against the injured
state to a state other than the one that committed the internationally
wrongful act.
The definition of coercion is important in seeing how coercion is
distinct from the other types of conduct leading to indirect
responsibility. The First Reading relied on a definition established by
Roberto Ago, which saw coercion as a state forcing another state to
commit an internationally wrongful act where there is no standing
relationship of control or dominance between the two states, but
where control is manifest only at the time of the wrongful act in
question. 30 The ILC's report for the First Reading distinguished the
type of control in coercion from other types as being "purely
occasional and not permanent," 31 or a temporary relationship during
the time of the coercion. Therefore, even though occupation is a form
of coercion in the broader sense, it is not covered under this definition
of coercion because of the existence of a continuing relationship,

28.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 152-56 (2002).

29.
See id. at 148.
30.
See Eighth Report, supra note 11, 5.
31.
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Thirty-first
Session, U.N. Doc. A/34/10, Supp. No. 10, 26, 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 93, 102 (1979)
[hereinafter Thirty-first Session Report).
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rather than a temporary one. The Commentary to the Second
Reading does not expressly reject Ago's focus on a temporary
relationship, but it emphasizes a different point-that coercion is
conduct that forces the will of the coerced state, giving it no effective
32
Still, it
choice but to comply with the wishes of the coercing state.
must implicitly rely on this element of temporary relationship of
control for its reasoning, for coercion loses its uniqueness from
occupation and the other situations that give rise to indirect
responsibility in Chapter IV when the element of temporary
relationship is removed. 33 The strength of the logic behind Article 18
and its wording significantly decreases when the uniqueness of
coercion becomes blurred. Yet, as explained in Part IV(C)(4) below,
any definition that relies explicitly or implicitly on a temporary
relationship is artificial, as temporary relationships do not appear to
exist between states. Before getting to these types of criticisms,
however, this Article looks at the state practice cited in support of
Article 18 to determine whether it reflects customary international
law.

III. ARTICLE 18

AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

A significant step in understanding the fictional elements of
Article 18 is to understand the customary international law in this
area. By "fiction," this Article uses the primary, plain-language
meaning: "[A]n imaginative creation or a pretense that does not
represent actuality but has been invented. '34 While the Author
acknowledges that there are many useful legal fictions, such as
Kelsen's view of the state as a normative order,3 5 this Article asserts
that Article 18 is a relatively useless one. As this Part shows, no
state practice or legal effect appears to derive from this provision,
which might reflect its uselessness as a legal fiction.3 6 As Part IV
explains, the source of this uselessness likely is its structure. In
addition to being a useless fiction, Article 18 might even be harmful

32.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 156.
33.
See Report of International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-first
Session, U.N. Doc. A/54/10, Supp. No. 10, T 275, 2(2) Int'l Law Comm'n 48, 69-73 (1999)
(noting this criticism implicitly) [hereinafter Fifty-first Session Report].
34.

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.,

2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=fiction

(last visited Aug.

25, 2006).
35.
See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 181 (A. Wedberg
trans., 1945).

36.
See Roberto Lavalle, The Law of the United Nations and the Use of Force,
Under the Relevant Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and 1991, to Resolve the
Persian Gulf Crisis, 23 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 64 (1992) (discussing legal

fictions).
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to establishing a robust system for determining state responsibility.
In the end, it might have been best to have left Article 18 out of the
Second Reading entirely.
A. The ILC as a CodificationBody
The ILC has several different roles. United Nations Charter
Article 13(1) states that the U.N. General Assembly "shall initiate
purpose
for
the
recommendations
and
make
studies
of... encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification. '37 The ILC was formed in 1947 to enable the
General Assembly to implement this provision, 38 and the ILC takes
up issues of international law at the recommendation of the General
Assembly. 39 The ILC determined that state responsibility was a
suitable topic for codification in 1949 and began its work in 1953 with
a U.N. General Assembly request to "undertake the codification of the
principles of international law governing State responsibility." 40 This
mandate expressly does not allow the ILC to contribute to the
progressive development of state responsibility, so one would be
justified in concluding that the ILC was intended to be limited to the
codification of customary international law. 4 1 After all, the ILC is the
main codification body of the United Nations and is beholden to the
42
General Assembly's authorization.
Some critics might argue that codification without progressive
development is impossible and that these two purposes are
inextricably linked. 43 Admittedly, virtually no distinction is made
between these two approaches in practice. In addition, the ILC often
drafts particular rules that are supported by little, if any, state
practice in order to articulate a complete set of rules. One need only

37.
U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1.
38.
Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 174 (II),
at 105, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947) (providing that the ILC
purpose is "the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification") [hereinafter ILC Statute].
39.
See Carl-August Fleischhauer, Article 13, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 265, 270 (Bruno Simma ed., 1995).
40.
Request for the Codification of the Principles of International Law
Governing State Responsibility, G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/2630 (Dec. 7, 1953), available at http://libwww.essex.ac.uk/HumanRights/
developmentbibdocs/ARES2630.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Request for
Codification].
41.
See International Law Commission, Origin and Background of the
Development and Codification of International Law, http://www.un.orgllaw/ilc/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2007).
42.
See United Nations Documentation Research Guide, http://www.un.orgl
Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
43.
See, e.g., Don M. McRae, The InternationalLaw Commission: Codification
and ProgressiveDevelopment after Forty Years, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 355, 362 (1987).
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look as far as VCLT Part V, § 2 on the Invalidity of Treaties, 44 which
represents yet another solid example of the ILC trying to be
exhaustive in its approach to codification, but losing some clarity in
the process. This want of clarity is due to the lack of state practice
that could have been drawn upon to help clarify certain key
distinctions, such as the distinction between error and fraud. 45 Still,
this does not mean that a distinction ought not to be made. After all,
Article 15 of the ILC statute lays these out as separate, even
mutually exclusive, principles: Progressive development is "the
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not
yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States," whereas
codification of international law is "the more precise formulation and
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there
''46
already has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine.
The Author sees progressive development and codification as two
distinct tasks that can be separated, because one theoretically can
take a snap shot of the international system at a certain time and try
to codify that customary international law without trying to mold its
future form. Other commentators would seem to agree, 47 as does the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases. 48 These tasks must be kept separate; otherwise, the ILC
would be allowed to operate ultra vires. Keeping in mind the
importance of the ILC limiting its acts to codification in this context,
the Article now turns to the state practice that supposedly forms the
basis for Article 18.
B. Scant State Practice
One simply cannot assume that Article 18 and its predecessor
reflect customary international law, as some commentators do. 49 To

44.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

45.

See, e.g., PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 173, 177-

331.
78 (Jos6 Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1995) (asserting, inter alia, that there is
"an almost total lack of practice in this field"); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE (2000).

46.
ILC Statute, supra note 38, art. 15.
47.
See Luis Barrionuevo Ar6valo, The Work of the International Law
Commission in the Field of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 493, 499 (2005); see also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation,44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 445 n.61 (2004) (arguing

the ILC is required to "employ differentiated procedures for the codification and
progressive development of customary international law").
48.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20).
49.
See Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on
Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
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determine customary international law, one must look to state
practice and opinio juris, which is to say that one must look for
"general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." 50 As is clear from the Commentaries, the
situations of coercion of another state are expected to be rare. Ago
recognized this when he pointed out that indirect responsibility was
seen as a special situation, with the subtopic of coercion of another
'51
state being a "somewhat marginal case of indirect responsibility.
Bin Cheng identified this roughly twenty-five years before Ago when
he stated that states would be held responsible for the acts of other
states only in exceptional circumstances. 52 Therefore, state practice
is expected to be rare.
Indeed, the debate prior to Ago was
theoretical, with virtually no mention of state practice or cases
whatsoever. Ago included examples, however, which created another
problem in that the examples seem to have tricked people into
thinking that this was something other than a theoretical debate.
Indeed, the cases that Ago cited, which the Commentaries for the
First and Second Readings continue to cite, are too weak to support
this type of indirect responsibility as an autonomous basis for
responsibility.
1.

The Shuster Case

The first cited case of state practice is the 1911 Shuster case. In
early 1911, the Persian government was having major financial
problems and asked the U.S. government how it could solve its
problems. 5 3 The U.S. government recommended a financial advisor,
and the Persian government entered into a contract with this
individual, Mr. W. Morgan Shuster. 54 However, it quickly became

REV. 27, 82 n.215 (1999); Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and
Countriesof Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 558 (1986).
50.
See generally North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 48, at 42-46;
Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30 (June 3); Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 264, 298-99
(Oct. 12); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1999);
ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 76-78 (1971).

51.
Eighth Report, supra note 11, 4. However, this Article acknowledges that
the situations of coercion of another state are not necessarily rare, as the superpowers
during the Cold War could have applied more coercion on other states to commit
internationally wrongful acts, for example, though they ultimately did not do so.
52.

See generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY

INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 208-14 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953)
(discussing the principle of individual responsibility).
53.
See Clement L. Bouv6, Russia's Liability in Tort for Persia's Breach of
Contract, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 389, 391-92 (1912); see also Eighth Report, supra note 11,
40 (also providing the basic background of the Shuster case).
54.
See Bouv6, supra note 53, at 391-92.
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clear to Shuster that he would not be able to function properly in
Persia because Russia saw his presence as a challenge to its
ambitions in the region.5 5 Shuster's suspicions proved correct when
Russia invaded Persia with 8,000 troops in an effort to have him and
his four assistants removed from Persia.56 Consequently, the Persian
government broke its contract with Shuster and compensated him for
the breach. 57 Some commentators believe that this compensation
prevented the U.S. government from invoking indirect responsibility
of the St. Petersburg government, which would have claimed that the
Persian authorities acted under coercion by the St. Petersburg
58
government.
2.

The Romano-Americana Company Case

The second cited case of state practice is the Romano-Americana
Company case of 1928. This is a case in which a U.S. company
suffered harm from the Romanian government's 1916 destruction of
59
the company's oil storage facilities located in Romanian territory.
At that time, Romania was at war with Germany, which was
preparing to invade Romania.6 0 The U.S. government believed that
the British government forced Romania to destroy the facilities in
anticipation of the German invasion, so it first brought a claim on
behalf of Romano-Americana against the British government. 6 1 The
British government refused to accept responsibility, because it
believed that it had urged, not forced, Romania to act in the common
interest. 62 The U.S. government changed its mind and instead
brought a claim against Romania, which assumed responsibility of
the acts committed by its organs. 63 Romania then compensated the
U.S. company, as it had done with British, French, Dutch, and
Belgian companies that similarly had been damaged. 64 The only
disagreement that commentators see between the United States and
the United Kingdom is whether Romania was coerced; it appeared as
though both governments had agreed that if there was any coercion,
the government exerting it would have been responsible for the
65
damages.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 392.
id.
Eighth Report, supra note 11, 40.
id. (citing Bouv6, supra note 53, at 389).
id. 41.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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Counterfactuals and Their Weak Conclusions

These cases are particularly weak support for the assertion that
Article 18 reflects customary international law. For starters, both
cases are old, and neither involved a judicial or arbitral
determination. Romano-Americana involved urging, not coercion,
which Romania apparently acknowledged. The U.S. claim against
Britain apparently lacked merit, as Romania already had
compensated numerous other foreign and domestic claimants for
similar claims that arose from the same general event. Why the
United States insisted on seeking compensation from Great Britain is
unclear. What is clear from this case, however, is that urging is
insufficient for indirect responsibility to arise, as the Second Reading
Commentary notes. 66 Most notably, this case does not directly
support the notion that coercion gives rise to indirect responsibility
for the coercing state, but rather that the United States perhaps can
be more creative than others in choosing from whom to seek
reparations. Furthermore, Shuster involved occupation of Persia by
the Tsarist troops, so it does not fall within the definition of coercion
in the context of state responsibility, which excludes occupation.
Though pure speculation, perhaps this is why the Commentary to the
Second Reading relegates Shuster to a footnote, 67 whereas the case
had been featured prominently in the past. 68 That said, Shuster
appears to come closer to coercion than Romano-Americana if the
Tsarist troops' occupation was, in fact, limited to a particular region
of Persia, and Persia retained some ability to exercise its sovereignty.
Still, the structural weaknesses of Article 18 that are discussed in
Part IV below make it so that no case conceivably could support
Article 18's current configuration.
In addition, the conclusions derived from these cases involve
serious counterfactual reasoning. Counterfactual reasoning is where
one imagines the world in a way other than the way it actually is, and
then divines what would have happened in a given situation. 69 For
example, if Manchester United had scored two more goals in the last
five minutes of the game, it would have won. The earlier event is the
antecedent, and the outcome is the desired consequence that is
assumed would have happened. 70 The fundamental problem with
this type of reasoning is that it involves a "fanciful and unknowable

66.
See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Second Reading, U.N. GAOR,
52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4JL.600, art. 18 (Aug. 21, 2000).
67.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 158 n.323.
68.
See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
69.
See Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra KinCannon, The Relation Between
Counterfactual ("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and
Implicationsfor Juror'sDecisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 241 (2001).
70.
See id.
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state of affairs," on account of it never having existed. 71 Therefore,
the reliability of such reasoning is highly suspect. In Shuster, the
Commentaries assert that if Persia had not paid Shuster, then the
United States would have had a claim against Russia based on
In Romano-Americana Company, the
indirect responsibility. 72
Commentaries see the argument not as whether there was such a
thing as indirect responsibility-because the states seemed to be
saying that if there was coercion, then there would be indirect
The case is
responsibility-but whether there was coercion. 73
essentially saying that if the British government had coerced
Romano, then there would have been indirect responsibility. Both
examples are based on tenuous counterfactual reasoning, which
certainly is not a strong enough basis for an entirely distinct theory of
indirect responsibility. Indeed, one cannot make any real conclusions
from what does not happen. Such unconvincing state practice might
be the clearest indication that Article 18 does not reflect customary
international law.
4.

Potentially
Agreements

Applicable

Scenarios:

Bilateral

Immunity

Admittedly, it is possible to tinker with the fact patterns of the
above two cases and dream up other hypothetical situations that
come closer to being an example of when Article 18 might come into
play. Such hypothetical situations would have to involve some type of
compulsion, whether armed or unarmed, where the target state's
organs still have sufficient independence to breach an international
obligation owed to another state, but the coerced state has no
effective choice. Putting aside the paradox discussed in Part IV(A)
below, one could conceivably envision a number of scenarios of
indirect responsibility coming from U.S. economic pressure on other
states to assist in the war on terror, for example. Perhaps the best
example is of U.S. pressure exerted on other states to enter into
bilateral immunity agreements to block those states from handing
over U.S. nationals to the International Criminal Court. In 2002, the
U.S. Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA), which prohibits the United States from providing military
assistance to a party to the Rome Statute unless it has signed a Rome
Statute Article 98 waiver, otherwise known as a bilateral immunity
agreement. 74 That said, U.S. pressure has not been limited to parties

71.
(1956).
72.
73.

See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact,9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67
See Eighth Report, supra note 11,
See id.

40.

41-42.

See Eric M. Meyer, International Law: The Compatibility of the Rome
74.
Statute of the International Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral Immunity
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of the Rome Statute. As of December 2005, ninety-two states had
entered into these agreements. 75 Apparently more states secretly
have entered into such agreements but have asked to remain
anonymous. 76 Twenty-three states that have refused to enter into an
agreement have been subjected to U.S. sanctions. 77 By signing these
agreements, these states-parties to the Rome Statute allegedly
violate the obligation under the fifth paragraph of the Preamble to
"put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [grave] crimes," thus
possibly breaching their international obligation to the rest of the
78
parties to the Rome Statute.
While some will be eager to point to this as coercion of another
state that potentially awakens the applicability of Draft Article 18, it
is a stretch to say that the targets of U.S. pressure are denied any
effective choice in the matter. Indeed, the U.S. threat under ASPA
appears to be limited to military aid, not other forms of aid. As a
result, the twenty-three states that have refused to enter these
agreements continue to survive, if not thrive, economically. Indeed,
when states such as Jordan took a tough stand against the United
States in utterly refusing to sign the agreement, the United States
eventually backed down,79 thus undermining the argument that these
so-called coerced states have had no choice in the matter. While such
sanctions might make it uncomfortable for states in search of U.S.
military parts and maintenance, these states likely will be able to get
these supplies from other sources, just as Iran apparently may have
done following its falling out with the United States in 1979.80
Moreover, as explained in Part IV(C)(4) below, the pressurized
relationship between the United States and these other states
continues beyond the breach of the international obligation under the
Rome Statute, as the threat of sanctions under the ASPA continues.

Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers' ProtectionAct, 58 OKLA. L. REV.
97, 99 (2005) (citing 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 2007,
116 Stat. 820, 899-909 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-32 (2004))).
75.
See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Status of U.S. Bilateral
Immunity Agreements, http://iccnow.org/?mod=bia (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
76.
See David A. Tailman, Note, Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the
Dilemma of Treaty Conflict, 92 GEO. L.J. 1033, 1044 n.90 (2004) (citing U.S.
Department of State Daily Press Briefing (June 12, 2003), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2003 21540.htm).
77.
See Johan D. van der Vyver, International Justice and the International
Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 133,
143 (2004).

78.

Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court, pmbl., U.N. Doc

AICONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).

79.
See Kenneth Roth, Human Rights as a Response to Terrorism, 6 OR. REV.
INT'L L. 37, 57 (2004).
80.
See, e.g., Tim Starks, House Measure Aims to Squelch Sale of F-14 Fighter
Parts to Iran, CQ WEEKLY, March 30, 2007 (noting reports that contraband components
of F-14 fighter aircraft ended up in Iran).
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Consequently, this is not a situation of coercion, which requires by
definition a temporary relationship of coercion only for the duration of
the wrongful act. Again, as explained in more detail in Part TV(C)(4),
all of these hypothetical situations likely will fail due to the artificial
requirements of a temporary relationship and no choice on the part of
the coerced state. Thus, Article 18 neither reflects customary
international law, nor is it likely to reflect such under its current
formulation.
C. Failureof Article 18 to Furtherthe GeneralProhibitionon Coercion
Even if Article 18 does not reflect customary international law,
the possibility remains that the normative purpose of Article 18 is to
support the general prohibition of coercion, which might be
However, this
considered as customary international law. 8 '
prohibition seems to be limited to armed force, similar to that found
in U.N. Charter Article 2(4).82 Indeed, customary international law
allows a state that has had its rights violated by another state to use
proportional, legal (presumably unarmed) coercion to encourage
termination of the violation or prevent future violations.8 3 Therefore,
Article 18 might go beyond this customary international law by
including within the definition of coercion types of coercion other than
armed coercion, such as economic coercion. 8 4 In Ago's proposal that
led to the Draft Articles after their First Reading, coercion was
considered so serious so as to separate responsibility from the act that
gave rise to that responsibility, and only coercion in the "sense in
which that term is accepted in the United Nations system" was
The ILC disagreed,
acceptable, not every form of pressure.8 5
concluding that coercion should not be limited to the threat or use of
armed force, but instead should cover all actions that seriously limit

See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
81.
(Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98-102 (June 17).
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. But see Vienna Convention on the Law of
82.
Treaties arts. 51, 52, May 23, 2969, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) (stating that coercion invalidates treaties,
which provisions generally are considered to be reflective of custom).
See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 131 (9th ed., 1992); Sarah H.
83.
Cleveland, Norm Internationalizationand U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 55 (2001).
Critics point to U.N. Charter Article 2(7) and the subsequent practice
84.
surrounding it as a prohibition of states from intervening in the domestic affairs of
other states through such means as economic coercion. See, e.g., Thomas W. Walde,
Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil & Gas Industry: CorporateResponse
Under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 183, 192 n.29

(2001). However, one must not overlook the fact that Article 2(7)'s prohibition only
applies to the United Nations itself, as expressly stated in the first line of that
provision. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
Eighth Report, supra note 11, 42 n.99.
85.
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the freedom of decision of the coerced state by making it extremely
difficult to act in a way different from that required by the coercing
state.8 6 The reason for this disagreement is not entirely clear, though
it likely reflects the ILC's desire to acknowledge the multiple ways
that states attempt to exercise control over one another.
Assuming, arguendo, that the customary international law on
coercion in general and Article 18 were parallel, Article 18 would not
further this prohibition and deter potential coercers, as explained in
the following Part. Indeed, while Article 18 mentions coercion, the
standard for coercion there is so high that potential coercers likely
will dismiss it as inapplicable or easily evadable, or will otherwise not
be deterred. Ultimately, Article 18 likely will be inapplicable to most,
if not all, forms of coercion due to Article 18's language. If Article 18
did not exist, much clearer provisions, such as Article 17, might apply
to cases of coercion-provisions that lack such strict and confusing
language as that of Article 18. Article 17, titled "Direction and
Control Exercised over the Commission of an Internationally
Wrongful Act," reads as follows:
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of
an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally
responsible for that act if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that
State.

87

The Commission itself recognized that a situation involving the
coercion of another state is similar to a situation in which a state is
under the direction and control of another state.8 8 However, the
principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali dictates that Article 18
will govern in cases involving coercion of another state. This canon of
construction, which is a general principle of law,8 9 provides that
specific legal provisions prevail over general ones when their
respective rules conflict. 90 Therefore, any benefits from the potential
applicability of Article 17 and any redundancy between Articles 17
91
and 18 are lost in such situations.

86.
See Thirty-first Session Report, supra note 31, 29.
87.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 17.
88.
See Thirty-first Session Report, supra note 31, 25, at 102.
89.
See Marti Koskenniemi, International Law Commission Study Group on
Fragmentation, Fragmentation of International Law: Topic (a): The Function and
Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of "Self-Contained Regimes" An
2.2, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentationOutline,
outline.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
90.
See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2004, 22 ARiZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 99, 156 (2005).

91.
Some critics might see Article 17 as more restrictive because of its language
of "directs and controls another State." Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra
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This Part has shown that Article 18 does not reflect customary
international law.
The next Part continues with the theme
established toward the end of this Part-that Article 18 does not, and
will not, deter potential coercers from engaging in coercion-and
attempts to explain why this is the case.

IV. THE STRUCTURAL FLAWS OF ARTICLE 18

Article 18 contains three structural flaws that doom it to
ineffectuality, which is the crux of this Article's thesis that Article 18
has significant fictional elements. Again, fiction does not mean that
92
it is a lie, but that it is an invention that does not reflect reality.
Each structural weakness is discussed below, in ascending order of
technical complexity.
A. The Circularityof Sovereignty
Article 18 contains a catch-22 type of circularity that ensures
state practice never evolves around it. 93 For Article 18 to apply, the
coerced state must retain sovereignty sufficient for its organs to

independently perform the internationally wrongful act. Otherwise,
the coercing state would be responsible under direct responsibility,
thus removing the need to sue under the provisions involving indirect
responsibility. However, when a state is coerced into acting, the
requisite sovereignty is lost, as sovereignty entails the ability of a
state to choose its own actions. 9 4

Coercion, as defined in the Article's

note 1, art. 17. However, one must not forget that "absolute" control is not required for
Article 17 to apply, nor must a controlling state also separately direct that controlled
state, as critics might be tempted to suggest. Id. On the contrary, as explained in Part
IV(C)(2), infra, Article 18 has absolute-type language with the "but for" test provided,
so Article 18 is far more restrictive than Article 17. Thus, in the end Article 18 will be
less of a deterrent for smart coercers, because they will realize that Article 18 is such a
high standard and that it will apply over Article 17, which lacks such a high standard.
92.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
93.
This might appear to the civil-law lawyer as a uniquely common-law way
of looking at the evolution of law. However, it is more a reflection of the difference
between lex ferenda and lex lata, and how the former becomes the latter.
94.
See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 851 (1979) (defining sovereignty as "a power to
make choices-about how to use public monies and direct public attention, and about
how to vary the choices as the needs of the community change"); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at
123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) (providing that an element of sovereignty is the
state's "right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural
systems"); Roth, supra note 79, at 1026. However, this Article acknowledges that force
majeure situations can be seen as an example of a state losing all effective choice and
yet still retaining sovereignty. That said, a distinction can be made in that force
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Commentary, is "[n]othing less than conduct which forces the will of
the coerced State . . . giving it no effective choice but to comply with
the wishes of the coercing State. '95 An earlier Commentary on the
First Reading recognized that "the coerced State behaves as a State
deprived of its sovereign capacity of decision. '96 It is a contradiction
to say that a semi-sovereign state has no choice without also losing
the very sovereignty characteristic needed for this type of indirect
responsibility to apply. Thus emerges the first paradox that renders
97
Article 18 a fiction.
This conclusion makes sense from a policy perspective.
In
domestic civil cases, persons (both legal and natural) are often held
responsible vicariously for acts that they did not themselves commit
but were instead committed by such entities as their representatives,
animals, or objects. 98 Such vicarious liability makes sense in those
cases because the principal or owner accepted a risk that the
representative, animal, or object might cause harm. 99
On the
international level, however, states are sovereign, which means that
states are responsible for their own decisions. The exception is where
that state has lost its sovereignty, either through complete occupation
or some other form of control. Article 18 positions itself awkwardly,
even artificially, in the nonsensical realm of independence without
choice-sovereignty without sovereignty, if you will. Such circularity
ensures that Article 18 never will be significantly relied upon. While
one might correctly think of coercion, in general terms, as involving
something less than the absolute elimination of the coerced's will, the
binary nature of Article 18's allocation of responsibility (discussed in
Part IV(C)(4) below) pushes such sound notions off to the side.
B. Disappearanceof the InternationallyWrongful Act
The second structural flaw of Article 18 is the disappearance of
the requisite internationally wrongful act. The basic elements for

majeure situations involve external conditions that cannot be attributed to another
entity (at least not one here on earth), though this distinction ultimately might not be
valid.
95.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 156.

96.
Thirty-first Session Report, supra note 31, 25, at 102.
97.
For a discussion of the overly narrow definition of coercion within the
context of international organization responsibility, see Jean d'Aspremont, Abuse of the
Legal Personality of International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member
States, 4 INT'L ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), and Albane Geslin, Riflexions sur la

Rdpartition de la Responsabilitd entre l'Organisation Internationale et ses Etats
Membres, 109 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 548, 575 (2005).
98.
See Antony Honor6, Causation in
the Law, in
THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Winter 2005), available at

http://plato.stanford.edularchives/win2OO5/entries/causation-law
2007).
99.
See id.

(last visited Apr. 15,
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state responsibility, as currently formulated under Draft Article 2 of
the Second Reading, are an internationally wrongful act that arises
from a "breach of an international obligation of the State" and
"attribution of that act to a state under international law."' 0 0
In
articulating the reasons behind holding a coercing state indirectly
responsible, Roberto Ago divided the attribution of the internationally
wrongful act to the coerced state from the attribution of the
responsibility for that internationally wrongful act. 101 The ILC's
report on the First Reading reflects this same reasoning. 0 2 This was
done because the coercing state did not commit the act that led to the
breach of the international obligation. Article 18 breaks this divide
down, allegedly because "there is no reason why the wrongfulness of
that act should be precluded vis-A-vis the coercing State.' 0 3
However, this ignores the reasons provided by Ago and the ILC.
Indeed, the coercing state simply did not commit the act that gave
rise to the breach of the international obligation. If the coerced state
did not commit the internationally wrongful act, as Article 18(a)
provides when it states that "the act would, but for the coercion, be an
internationally wrongful act of the coerced State," 104 where is the key
internationally wrongful act that is required by Draft Article 1?
Certainly the victim did not commit the internationally wrongful act.
The coercing state may or may not have committed an internationally
wrongful act vis-A-vis the coerced state in the form of the coercion
itself, but this is an entirely separate issue when it comes to a
discussion of indirect responsibility vis-A-vis the injured state.
What Article 18 likely was intended to establish was the
displacement
of attribution,
and
ultimately
international
responsibility, to the coercing state. However, under Draft Article 1,
one must still find an internationally wrongful act in order to ascribe
responsibility, which is something that Article 18 neglects.
In the end, Ago's division of the attribution of responsibility and
the attribution of the internationally wrongful act makes
overwhelming sense, which is lost in Article 18 as presently
constituted. Without an internationally wrongful act, any kind of
responsibility becomes tenuous under this provision, thus impeding
significantly the Article's chances of ever reflecting actuality.
C. Confusion Between Cause-in-Factand Legal Causation
The third structural flaw of Article 18 is the most complex as it
involves causation, a general topic that seems to plague scholars and

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 2.
See Eighth Report, supra note 11, 39.
See Thirty-first Session Report, supra note 31, 28.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 157.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 18(a).
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courts alike. 105 The Second Reading for Article 18 added a new
standard of causation to indirect responsibility with the "but for"
language: "if (a) the act would, but for the coercion, be an
internationally wrongful act of the coerced State .... ,106 This
language was added to ensure its application in only the narrowest of
circumstances. 10 7 However, what Article 18's specific formulation
does is confuse the different types of causation, hence discouraging
potential claimants from using it as a basis for their recovery for fear
of being held to a high standard of causation. Before analyzing these
types of causation, it is important to note that the ILC likely did not
have this detailed an understanding of but-for causation in their
minds when they adopted the language of Article 18. That said, this
does not change the grammatical strictness of "but for" or the
likelihood that Special Rapporteur James Crawford-a renowned
common-law lawyer-knew of this phrase's eccentricities. With this
in mind, this Part explores the more theoretical flaws of Article 18 as
it relates to causation.
1.

The Different Types of Causation

Causation is an important part of all areas of law, especially the
law of state responsibility, in that it is causation alone (whether a
state or its organs caused an injury), not fault (knowledge or
negligence), that determines responsibility.10 8 In common law, there
are two components to causation: the first is cause-in-fact, which
focuses on whether the defendant's actions were the necessary cause
of the injury at issue, and the second is legal causation, or proximate
cause, which focuses on what legal consequences should apply to the
defendant's injurious conduct.' 0 9 This latter type of causation is used
to identify only those causes-in-fact that are sufficiently connected to
the outcome to have been the foreseeable cause of that outcome, thus

105.
See Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpretingthe Nexus Clause in
the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265, 300 (2002); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985).
106.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Second Reading, U.N. GAOR, 52nd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.600, art. 18 (Aug. 21, 2000) (emphasis added).
107.
See International Law Commission, Provisional Summary Record of the
2605 Meeting for the Fifty-first Session, July 19, 1999, UN Doc. AICN.4/SR.2605, at 1011 [hereinafter ILC Provisional Summary].
108. See RAY AUGUST, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 346 (Prentice Hall 1995)
(citing Lighthouse Arbitration (Fr. v. Greece), 23 INT'L L. REP. 352-53 (1956) (rejecting
a claim for damages following an evacuation because there was no causal connection
between the damage caused by the fire and the damage following the evacuation, as
the latter damage was "neither a foreseeable nor a normal consequence of the
evacuation")).
109.
See Foster, supra note 105, at 300-01; Ernest J. Weinrib, A Step Forward in
Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518, 518 (1975).
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making them the causes-in-law. 110 But-for causation relates to the
former type, which originates from common-law tort jurisprudence
and is still used in many common-law states.1 ' Therefore, it is no
surprise if the but-for language of Article 18 immediately jumps out
for common-law lawyers and not for civil-law lawyers.
But-for
causation is also a long-established principle in international law,
where it must be shown that the wrongdoer's act was the cause-infact of the injury (which "cannot be attributed to any other cause")
and the proximate cause (such that the "reasonable man in the
position of the wrongdoer at the time would have foreseen [such
damage] as likely to ensue from his action") in order to demand
112
compensation from the alleged wrongdoer.
The plain-language meaning of the idiomatic preposition "but
for" connotes a strict causal relationship between the antecedent
condition and the outcome: "But for the children, they would have
gotten a divorce long ago." 113 In the legal context, "but for" has the
same strict sense of causation: "of or relating to the necessary cause
(as a negligent act) without which a particular result (as damage)
would not have occurred." 114 In other words, the but-for test in this
setting determines not just a necessary condition but also a sufficient,
or at least a substantial, condition. 115 The quintessential example of
but-for causation is one in which a passenger on a boat with no life
preservers fell overboard and drowned, but the owner of the boat was
not held liable because it could not be shown that the lack of life
preservers was the necessary condition for the drowning to have
occurred. 116 There is no other, softer definition of "but for": but-for
language is the strictest standard for causation. Indeed, legislatures
often introduce a but-for test of causation when they want to narrow

110.
See Knutsen, supra note 6, at 252.
111.
See generally id. at 250, 253 n.7 (citing U.S., U.K., and Canadian tort
cases); Foster, supra note 105, at 305 n.163 (citing Australian, Canadian, and U.S.
cases for the principle).
112.
See CHENG, supra note 52, at 249-50 (quoting Samoan Claims Award
(Germany v. U.S. and U.K.) U.S. Dep't of State National Archives, 210 Dispatches
(1902)); see also Gregory D. DiMeglio, Claims Against Iraq: The UN Compensation
Commission and Other Remedies, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 477, 499 (1992)

(reporting that Richard B. Lillich stated that the but-for rule is "the usual causation
rule in international law that goes back beyond Borchard and Eagleton").
113.

CHRISTINE AMME, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS (1997),

available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=but%20for (last visited Apr. 15,
2007).
114.
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (10th ed., 1996.), available at
http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/results.pl?co=dictionary.lp.findlaw.com&topic=e
O/e018498e4b750252d3c154f724556c09 (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (emphasis added).
115.
Please note that this would appear to be a divergence from formal logic, in
that no one cause can be sufficient in a complex chain of events. Still, this does not
seem to deter common-law courts from looking for the necessary cause.
116.
See generally New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir.
1920).
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or tighten the application of a legal principle.1 1 7 The same is true for
international law, with but-for language being viewed as "deny[ing]
the possibility
of developing" the principle that contains such
n8
language.
The but-for test of causation is best applied when all the facts
are available and easily discernible. 119 The test is appropriate where
it is possible to establish that one condition, among competing
120
conditions, was the necessary condition for the outcome at issue.
Indeed, the test is often abandoned in favor of a more flexible test for
causation in the domestic context when the case involves mixed
sources of causation of the injury. 121 If the test is used where there
are multiple causes-in-fact, and it is found that the injury would not
have occurred without the respondent's act, then that respondent can
be held liable for the injury, even though others that may necessarily
have caused the injury can also be held liable in a joint-and-several
liability arrangement. 122 Based on this description of the general
meaning of "but for," the Article turns to answering what "but for"
means exactly in Article 18. It turns out that its usage here is
counterintuitive.
2.

The Problems with 'But For" in Article 18

Article 18 is problematic with regard to "but for" and but-for
causation for two reasons. First, the "but for" language here is
particularly confusing. Such language generally indicates that a
123
factual determination on causation is involved, not legal causation.
At first glance, it is obvious that the but-for test of Article 18 is not
the typical one because the claimant is not required to show that the
injury would not have happened but for the coercion, even though the
claimant presumably must show coercion by the coercing state.
Moreover, Article 18 is not talking about whether the coercion rises to
a sufficient level for indirect responsibility to be applied to the
coercing state. Once past the surface, it becomes clear that Article 18
deals with legal causation---or what legal consequences should apply
to the respondent's injurious conduct once coercion has been showndespite this cause-in-fact language. Indeed, whether the coercing
state or the coerced state is responsible for the internationally

117.
See Foster, supra note 105, at 282 (referring to the Australian Legislature's
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001, Bills Digest No. 55 2001-02, at 11).
118.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 232 (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs).
119.
See generally Knutsen, supra note 6, at 253-54.
120.
See id. at 253. Please see disclaimer in supra note 115.
121.
See Foster, supra note 105, at 281-82.
122.
See Fowler Harper & Fleming James, Jr., Legal Cause, in FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY 314 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961).

123.

See Foster, supra note 105, at 314-15.
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wrongful act is a question of law. This point is supported by the
Commentary, which indicates that "but for the coercion" reflects the
notion that the responsibility of the coerced state will be precluded
vis-A-vis the injured third state. 124 However, this is not the normal
meaning and usage for "but for," which can be. confusing.
As a result of this confusion, potential claimants are unlikely to
know what they will have to prove and to what level they will have to
prove it, which likely will deter them from bringing claims under this
provision. Indeed, these issues are entirely unclear under Article 18.
If taken as a factual causation test, one is forced to make sense of
"but for." The essential grammatical structure for "but for" is: "but
for X, Y would not have occurred."
This translates into the
conditional formulation "if X, then Y." Examples of but-for causation
statements are readily found throughout the international law
literature. 125 For example, but for the speedboat attack on the USS
Vincennes (X), Flight 655 would not have been destroyed (y).12 6 This
translates into the assertion that the speedboat attack caused the
destruction of Flight 655. Here, the language is (after reordering the
phrase for the sake of clarity) "but for the coercion," "the act would..
. be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State.' 1 27 Noncoercion is the X variable, and attribution of the internationally
wrongful act to the coerced State is the Y variable. The translation of
this subparagraph is: if X, then Y, or that the absence of coercion
necessarily causes the coerced state to incur attribution of the
internationally wrongful act, or that coercion necessarily caused the
coerced state to avoid attribution of the internationally wrongful act.
Likewise, the contrapositive, and only the contrapositive, is
necessarily true. 128 The contrapositive of "if X, then Y' is "if not Y,
then not X." This translates into: if the coerced state avoids
attribution of an internationally wrongful act, then there was
coercion. In other words, coercion places all of the responsibility on
the coercing state. How the claimant would be expected to prove that
it had absolutely no options other than committing the
internationally wrongful act is ambiguous, even perhaps nonsensical,

124.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 18 (Commentary).
125.
These examples are provided merely to illustrate the usage of "but for" and
do not indicate the Author's support for the assertions made in these examples in any
way.
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See David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage,
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also John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the Middle
East as a FactorBehind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815, 827 (2002)
(providing other but-for language in regard to U.S. funding of Israeli settlements and
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127.
See Linnan, supra note 126.
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thus indicating that Article 18 must be talking about legal causation.
On the contrary, Article 18 is a declaration of responsibility being
limited to the coercing state, which would appear to be legal
causation. However, the strict but-for reasoning, within this legal
causation context, fails here because it does not lead to a just
129
result.
While attributive causation is still a type of causation, it is legal
in nature, not factual, in that it deals with the legal consequences of
an act. 130 However, the causative link in Article 18 is unrealistic. In
essence, Article 18 makes an attributive, or rather negative
attributive, causal link: coercion by the coercing state leads to no
responsibility for the coerced state. The corollary to this is that the
coercion places all of the responsibility on the coercing state.
Therefore, for Article 18 to be a grounds for a claim, the coercing
state's coercion must be absolute (as appears to be required by the
text of Article 18). Otherwise, the coercing state would be held
responsible for a disproportionate share of the responsibility, which
would be unjust. The coercion is a reason for shifting some of the
responsibility from the coerced state to the coercing state, but not a
reason for shifting all of the responsibility, as the internationally
wrongful act was completed, at least in part, because of the coerced
state's own voluntary actions. It is possible that the coerced state
acted beyond what was demanded by the coercing state or failed to
resist small levels of coercion by the coercing state and instead used
the coercion as a pretext to do what it always wanted to do to the
injured state, both of which would be unforeseeable by the coercing
state. 131 Indeed, typically there are many factors that influence a
state's decisions-here, the coerced state's decision to breach an
international obligation it owed the injured state. 132 No one can
know what actually drove the coercing state, through its leaders, to
commit the internationally wrongful act. 1 33 Justice would seem to
require the sharing of responsibility between the coerced and the
coercing states to some degree, or at least a holding of joint and
several responsibility for the two states, and not to assess coercion in
a binary manner. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to show that
either cause was the necessary one, it is clear that all of the possible
causes (the coerced and the coercing states' acts) put together were

129.
See Spellman & KinCannon, supra note 69, at 254.
130.
See Honor6, supra note 98; Foster, supra note 105, at 297-98, 300.
131.
See CHENG, supra note 52, at 242 (quoting Angola Arbitration (Portugal v.
Germany), Award I, 2 UN REP. INVL ARB. AWARDS 1011, 1031 (1928), saying it is an
"inadmissible extension of responsibility" to include losses unconnected with the initial
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132.
See Michael J. Glennon, How InternationalRules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 966
(2005).
133.
See id. at 967.
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jointly sufficient to lead to that act. 134 Therefore, a type of causation
other than but-for causation is needed. 135 To make the injured state
prove that the coercing state's coercion was the necessary cause of the
injury-to the point that there is no responsibility due the coerced
state-is an overly high burden that few, if any, can meet on account
of international relations being so much more complex than a garden136
variety common-law tort case.
3.

But-For Language in Legal Causation: Unsuitable Bedfellows

Regardless of this confusion over legal and factual causation, and
"but for" being inappropriate wording for legal causality, "but for" still
retains its grammatical strictness. The result is that "but for"
becomes a declaration of a strict legal relationship that is not
necessarily accurate-that coercion by the coercing state absolves the
coerced state of any responsibility. This is so despite what the
Commentary would have one believe when it alludes to flexibility
with "in most cases" and "no effective choice. '137 Such flexible
language contradicts the very nature of "but for," which indicates a
clear causal relationship with no exceptions. One must not forget
that this is not the exact tortuous but-for causation of tort law in the
common-law system, which begins with a strict but-for analysis and
138
then introduces policy reasoning to limit or augment liability.
Here, Article 18's attributive causation starts and ends with a strict
but-for test.
With regard to legal causation, Article 18 appears to assume that
any amount of coercion is sufficient for all of the responsibility to be
placed upon the coercing state and to absolve the coerced state of any
responsibility. In other words, Article 18 simply assumes that the
coercion will be the proximate cause of the injury and the reason why
However, proximate
the coerced state is not held responsible.
causation is a separate and distinct test for causation, where the
injured claimant must show that there is an "unbroken connection"
between the coercing state's act and the injury suffered that can be
"clearly, unmistakably, and definitely traced" to the coercing state's
act. 13 9 Such an unbroken connection simply cannot be assumed, as it
is in Article 18, especially when the coerced state's own act always
will fulfill the role of an intervening cause. One might think that

134.
See Honor6, supra note 98.
135.
See generally Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of CausalIntervention, 88
CAL. L. REV. 827, 827-78 (2000) (discussing the metaphysics of causal intervention).
See Glennon, supra note 132, at 968.
136.
137.
See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 156-57 (emphasis added).
See Foster, supra note 105, at 274-75.
138.
See CHENG, supra note 52, at 243 (quoting Administrative Decision No. II,
139.
German-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission, Dec. & Op. 5, 12-13 (1923)).
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potential claimants would be encouraged to bring claims under
Article 18 on account of its assumption that the proximate cause was
the coercion. However, the "but for" language and the ambiguity of
Article 18 combine to make such a murky picture of the causation
requirement that potential claimants are likely to be scared off
entirely. In addition, because the but-for test of causation does not
work well where there are multiple causes for an injury, 140 it should
not be applied here where the coerced state and the coercing state
both may be the cause of the injury. Even if it were applied to such a
case with multiple causes, attribution of all the responsibility to the
coercing state under Article 18 strays from the standard of holding
the coercing and coerced states potentially jointly and severally
liable. 14 1 This type of joint and several liability between the coercing
and coerced states appears to be what Draft Article 19 has in mind,
which goes beyond being a mere consistency clause to expressly
keeping the coerced state and all others on the hook for
responsibility. 142 In particular, Article 19 reads: "This Chapter is
without prejudice to the international responsibility, under other
provisions of these articles, of the State which commits the act in
question, or of any other State. ' 14 3 In that regard, Articles 18 and 19
appear to conflict.
4.

Degrees of Coercion

As already mentioned in the preceding Section, Article 18
assumes that coercion is a binary function-either coercion leads to
full responsibility for the coercing state or it does not. As some
commentators have noted, state responsibility generally is seen as
being indivisible. Under this view, it is not possible to allocate
varying degrees of responsibility to the respective states. 144 This
approach to state responsibility is incorrect for two reasons. First, in
reality, there are varying degrees of coercion, which should lead to
varying degrees of responsibility in a joint-responsibility type of
arrangement. The spectrum of coercion conceivably runs from a gun
to a leader's head to a stern diplomatic request with actual coercion
only looming in the distant background. While all of these might fit
under the definition of coercion (assuming the coercion is temporary,
if such is even possible, as discussed in the following paragraph), the
intensity of the coercion is obviously different, and so ought to be the
level of responsibility. Under the control theory explained in Part
II(A) above, which acted as the basis for this portion of the Draft

140.
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See Foster, supra note 105, at 274, 308-09, 322-23.
See text accompanying supranote 98.
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Articles, responsibility of the coerced state ought to be in proportion
to its freedom of action, and responsibility for the coercing state ought
to be in proportion to the freedom it denied the coerced state. Any
approach to indirect responsibility that lacks such logic, such as
Article 18's approach, nags at one's notions of justice and state
equality. Indeed, there can be no such thing as absolute coercion or
absolute causation in such complex relations as those between
states. 145 As Japanese ILC member Mr. Tsuruoka commented, "No
coercion was so strong that it left no freedom of action at all to the
State subjected to it." ' 146 There are many situations in international
relations, as well as in interpersonal relationships, where an entity
has an influence on another entity's decision without it being shown,
or being possible to be shown, that the act (here, an internationally
wrongful act) would not have happened but for (read: without) that
influence. 147 To say that the coercing state is absolutely responsible
for the injury and the coerced state is absolved of all responsibility on
account of the coercion ignores reality.
Second, contrary to the definition of coercion as first expressed
by Ago and implicitly adopted by Crawford in the Second Reading,
which relies on a temporary relationship of control for the duration of
the wrongful act, a temporary relationship of control does not appear
to exist in interstate relations. Indeed, coercion is throughout the
international system, and the self-interest of a state that flows from
the coercion of another state is a major reason why states follow
international legal rules, or do anything else for that matter. 148 The
international system seems to be based, at least partially, on coercion
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Critics might wonder how this view of coercion would impact an analysis of
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which voids a
treaty "if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,"
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Vienna
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between states, though the form of coercion often differs. 14 9 As a
would-be coercer's credibility increases with every threat it carries
out, the need to keep carrying them out diminishes with each game,
as merely the hint of punishment triggers the desired result. 150 In
other words, once a dominant position is perceived or established,
express threats need not be made in exercising control over a state,
since states are involved in a repeat-game scenario. 151 Indeed,
interstate relations tend to go on endlessly. 152 Admittedly, coercion
loses its uniqueness from occupation and the other situations that
give rise to indirect responsibility in Chapter IV if the element of
temporary relationship is removed. 153 However, this element makes
little sense in interstate relations.
Finally, it is interesting to note one practical problem to coercion
being a basis for indirect responsibility. Coercion is often seen as
legitimate when the coerced state remains a net beneficiary, thus
making the outcome relatively easy to achieve for the coercing
state. 154 This raises the possibility that the coerced states will refuse
to cooperate with the injured state in making a case against the
coercing state, when such cooperation is usually necessary to prove
coercion. 55 Even if the coerced state is not the net beneficiary of the
coercion, it still may remain in the coerced state's interest not to
cooperate with the injured state's claim of coercion, for if coercion
worked once on the coerced state, it is likely to work again. Though
pure speculation, this might have been what happened in Shuster
and Romano-Americana, with Persia and Romania being compelled
by Russia and Great Britain, respectively, to claim responsibility for
the breach and pay compensation so that Russia and Great Britain
would not have to do so through a theory of indirect responsibility.
Indeed, the coercing state has every incentive to apply coercion again
on the coerced state to deny the earlier coercion, as the prospects of
being held indirectly responsible increase.
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V. CONCLUSION

Roberto Ago ought to be commended for his thoroughness, while
he was preparing for the First Reading of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, in identifying and addressing so many ways in which
a state might be held indirectly responsible. However, his largely
academic exercise led to the creation of a basis of indirect
responsibility that was not particularly supported by state practicenamely, coercion of another state. Perhaps out of respect for Ago's
work, this principle developed into an autonomous principle with its
very own article number in the Second Reading of the Draft Articles.
Despite this perceived progress, Article 18 no more reflects customary
international law than it did before under its old number Article
28(2). On the contrary, three fundamental flaws in Article 18 ensure
that no state will be able or willing to bring a claim under it, as
Article 18 raises the bar exceedingly high with its language "but for
the coercion," among other things. The normative purpose of Article
18 could have been to support the international community's general
disdain for coercion by creating a deterrent for such action. However,
the definition of coercion is so artificial that no real deterrence seems
probable. Although Article 17 has the potential to deter coercing
states by creating an applicable basis of indirect responsibility for
acts of coercion without the three structural weaknesses listed for
Article 18, the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali removes
general Article 17 from possible application when Article 18 is
applicable. As Article 18 seems to contain a high standard for
causation through its "but for" language, potential coercers might be
encouraged to coerce other states after finding these weaknesses in
the only state responsibility provision that would directly apply to
that situation. The Draft Articles would be better off without Article
18, as its absence would stop the perpetuation of a relatively useless
legal fiction, thereby increasing the perceived validity of the
remaining provisions.

